How do Just War theories expect to justify the pursuit of some wars? How can we ever conclude that some particular war may be more moral than another? Although there are some differences in the principles used, we can point to two basic ideas which have to do with how to best wage war as a general matter.

They are categorized as jus in bello and have to do with how to best wage war as a general matter.


There are also five additional criteria which are concerned with whether or not it is just to launch any particular war, known as jus ad bellum, which are covered elsewhere.

 

Proportionality: The principle of proportionality requires that, when engaged in warfare, our actions be proportional to our goals. Any military action will necessarily be destructive on some level, but we must ask what we expect to gain from that action and whether the resulting good outweighs whatever evil came from the destruction.

It?s easy to come up with extreme situations in which this criterion would apply. Quickly killing a couple of sentries in order to capture an extremely important city with no further loss of life would be just, while using a nuclear bomb in order to wipe out a minor observation post would be unjust. Outside of such extremes, however, the situation is murkier and it can be difficult to determine just how proportional an action really is.

 

Noncombatant Immunity: The second main criterion of waging a just war involves discriminating between combatants and noncombatant personnel.

This means that actively targeting and killing combatants is commensurate with a just war while actively targeting and killing, or not caring if you target and kill, noncombatants is not commensurate with a just war.

Generally speaking, this seems like a very good principle. It isn?t possible to wage a war without attacking the military, but we are not inclined to support a government which actively seeks the death of civilians or which simply doesn?t care if civilians die. Unfortunately, the deaths of some civilians is probably inevitable, but the main question is how much the government does to avoid that.

Upon closer inspection, however, this is actually a very difficult principle to use. The primary problem comes in distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants. Traditionally this distinction is the same as the one between the military and civilians, but that isn?t always justified. Who is a more justified target: a conscript on the front lines who would rather be home tending a garden, or a political functionary back home who is happily in charge of conscripting gardeners?

Who is a more justified target: a general who disagrees with the war but feels that he must ?do his duty? and follow the orders of his political superiors, or a propagandist who would never actually join the military herself, but who actively supports the war and is in fact personally responsible for whipping the populace into a war-frenzy? Neither the military/civilian nor the combatant/noncombatant distinction appears entirely justified.

There are also further complications when we consider the situation of democracies. In a democracy the people are sovereign, and as such can be held accountable for the actions of their government. Even those who vehemently disagree with the government participate in the democratic process and as a consequence implicitly accept the fact that the results may be disagreeable. If all participants share some responsibility for the results, can it really be said that anyone of voting age in a democratic state can be excluded as a legitimate target in a war?

« Jus ad Bellum and Launching War | War & Morality »