RB211 757 Maintenance
More than two decades later, the exact cost of the 757 and 767 programs is still unclear.
Boeing is said to have spent US$2.
5 billion on expanding the Renton and Everett manufacturing and assembly sites, including US$500m on Computer Numerical Control (CNC)l plant.
No details, for example, of the Japanese government's financial contribution to the 767 appear to have been made generally available.
The final Boeing 757 was delivered in April 2005 reflecting the market reality for the 757, which could no longer compete with the much younger Airbus A321.
A total of 1,050 were made, making the 757 the sixth biggest selling jetliner in history, an impressive achievement given its poor sales performance during the 1980s.
(Its sales boom came late in life as US airlines replaced their time-expired 727s.
) A breakdown of these figures reveals that more than 700 of these orders were from US operators.
This reflects a trend seen in most of Boeing's current family of aircraft: they sell better in America and Japan than the rest of the world.
Since 2000, it has become clear that the 767 is also approaching the end of its production life, though no official announcement has yet been made.
In the 1990s, Airbus's A300-600 and A310 were reinforced by the A330-200, which is a fierce and successful competitor to both the 767 and the 777.
Despite this, it was hoped to keep the 767 production line going with the projected KC-767 tanker deal with the USAF, worth US$23.
5 billion.
However, following procurement irregularities involving Boeing personnel, the US Congress killed off the lease deal.
Nevertheless, Boeing still hope to sell KC-767s to the USAF so the 767 may yet pass the magic 1000 units sales figure and help keep them in business until the 787 arrives.
RB211 757 maintenance The RB211-535 is a three-shaft, high by-pass-ratio turbofan designed to power the Boeing 757.
The engine's principal merit becomes most evident at 757 heavy maintenance checks, low maintenance costs! It entered service in 1983 and about 80% of 757 customers have this engine for their aircraft.
This engine is highly reliable.
There are apparently more than 1,200 RB211 757 s all over the world with more than 50 airlines, and rated at 37,000 pounds of thrust.
Rolls-Royce agreed RB211 engine line maintenance with Monarch Airlines in 2007, whereby a long-term contract to support the RB211-535s that power Monarch's Boeing 757s was agreed at a fixed dollar rate per flying hour, eliminating unpredictability and hidden costs.
The Rolls-Royce RB211, also powers Airbus A330s in the fleet and they are included in the RB211 engine line maintenance package.
Conclusion The 757 and 767 were a response to Airbus's A300 and A310.
After difficult starts, both went on to achieve good sales figures.
However, they were not successful enough to prevent many airlines, particularly those outside the USA, from switching from Boeing aircraft to Airbus products, despite the product support and training complications such a move entailed.
As the newcomer Airbus found it difficult, but not impossible, to challenge Boeing's market position.
The widebody twin concept was copied by Boeing on the 767, but not with sufficient effect to kill off the A300, which has now reached nearly 600 units sold, more than both the DC-10 and the L-1011.
So, in other words, Airbus's first product was good enough to beat the offerings of the number two and three players in the US and also eat into the market share of the number one, Boeing.
So what went wrong for BCA? How did Airbus successfully challenge the incumbent? The truth is, Boeing got some of the technical decisions wrong.
The aviation axiom that if you get the cross-section of an airliner wrong, it doesn't matter what else you get right, was borne out by the 757 and 767.
There seems little doubt that if the 767 had had a wider cross-section it would have been a significantly more difficult aircraft for Airbus Industrie to counter, given its greater,stretch' and longer range.
(The 767's replacement, the 787, will have a significantly wider cabin.
) Boeing's sales figures show that the 767 outsold the A310 by a ratio of three-to-one.
However, that is a deliberate distortion of the data as the 767-300 is nearer in size to the A300B/A300-600R.
Once the sales for these two Airbus subtypes are factored in we can see that the sales war was very close indeed.
Epilogue In 1985, BCA launched the 747-400, a heavily revised version of its monopoly product, which took three years to bring to market.
At the end of the 1980s it was the major contributor to record BCA revenues of US$8 billion, which generated an operating profit of US$317m or just 4.
7%.
The return on Boeing's defense sales, such as the AGM-86B cruise missile, was nearly twice as much.
With sales of the new 757 and 767 aircraft below expectations, Boeing concluded its capital could be more profitably employed developing new non-airliner products and, like MDC before it, decided to concentrate on derivatives of its existing family of airliners.
It is arguable that that decision, more than any of the shortcomings of the 757 and 767 outlined here, was ultimately the most damaging to BCA's long-term prospects.
It was certainly the beginning of the end for Boeing as the market leader in large commercial aircraft.
Boeing is said to have spent US$2.
5 billion on expanding the Renton and Everett manufacturing and assembly sites, including US$500m on Computer Numerical Control (CNC)l plant.
No details, for example, of the Japanese government's financial contribution to the 767 appear to have been made generally available.
The final Boeing 757 was delivered in April 2005 reflecting the market reality for the 757, which could no longer compete with the much younger Airbus A321.
A total of 1,050 were made, making the 757 the sixth biggest selling jetliner in history, an impressive achievement given its poor sales performance during the 1980s.
(Its sales boom came late in life as US airlines replaced their time-expired 727s.
) A breakdown of these figures reveals that more than 700 of these orders were from US operators.
This reflects a trend seen in most of Boeing's current family of aircraft: they sell better in America and Japan than the rest of the world.
Since 2000, it has become clear that the 767 is also approaching the end of its production life, though no official announcement has yet been made.
In the 1990s, Airbus's A300-600 and A310 were reinforced by the A330-200, which is a fierce and successful competitor to both the 767 and the 777.
Despite this, it was hoped to keep the 767 production line going with the projected KC-767 tanker deal with the USAF, worth US$23.
5 billion.
However, following procurement irregularities involving Boeing personnel, the US Congress killed off the lease deal.
Nevertheless, Boeing still hope to sell KC-767s to the USAF so the 767 may yet pass the magic 1000 units sales figure and help keep them in business until the 787 arrives.
RB211 757 maintenance The RB211-535 is a three-shaft, high by-pass-ratio turbofan designed to power the Boeing 757.
The engine's principal merit becomes most evident at 757 heavy maintenance checks, low maintenance costs! It entered service in 1983 and about 80% of 757 customers have this engine for their aircraft.
This engine is highly reliable.
There are apparently more than 1,200 RB211 757 s all over the world with more than 50 airlines, and rated at 37,000 pounds of thrust.
Rolls-Royce agreed RB211 engine line maintenance with Monarch Airlines in 2007, whereby a long-term contract to support the RB211-535s that power Monarch's Boeing 757s was agreed at a fixed dollar rate per flying hour, eliminating unpredictability and hidden costs.
The Rolls-Royce RB211, also powers Airbus A330s in the fleet and they are included in the RB211 engine line maintenance package.
Conclusion The 757 and 767 were a response to Airbus's A300 and A310.
After difficult starts, both went on to achieve good sales figures.
However, they were not successful enough to prevent many airlines, particularly those outside the USA, from switching from Boeing aircraft to Airbus products, despite the product support and training complications such a move entailed.
As the newcomer Airbus found it difficult, but not impossible, to challenge Boeing's market position.
The widebody twin concept was copied by Boeing on the 767, but not with sufficient effect to kill off the A300, which has now reached nearly 600 units sold, more than both the DC-10 and the L-1011.
So, in other words, Airbus's first product was good enough to beat the offerings of the number two and three players in the US and also eat into the market share of the number one, Boeing.
So what went wrong for BCA? How did Airbus successfully challenge the incumbent? The truth is, Boeing got some of the technical decisions wrong.
The aviation axiom that if you get the cross-section of an airliner wrong, it doesn't matter what else you get right, was borne out by the 757 and 767.
There seems little doubt that if the 767 had had a wider cross-section it would have been a significantly more difficult aircraft for Airbus Industrie to counter, given its greater,stretch' and longer range.
(The 767's replacement, the 787, will have a significantly wider cabin.
) Boeing's sales figures show that the 767 outsold the A310 by a ratio of three-to-one.
However, that is a deliberate distortion of the data as the 767-300 is nearer in size to the A300B/A300-600R.
Once the sales for these two Airbus subtypes are factored in we can see that the sales war was very close indeed.
Epilogue In 1985, BCA launched the 747-400, a heavily revised version of its monopoly product, which took three years to bring to market.
At the end of the 1980s it was the major contributor to record BCA revenues of US$8 billion, which generated an operating profit of US$317m or just 4.
7%.
The return on Boeing's defense sales, such as the AGM-86B cruise missile, was nearly twice as much.
With sales of the new 757 and 767 aircraft below expectations, Boeing concluded its capital could be more profitably employed developing new non-airliner products and, like MDC before it, decided to concentrate on derivatives of its existing family of airliners.
It is arguable that that decision, more than any of the shortcomings of the 757 and 767 outlined here, was ultimately the most damaging to BCA's long-term prospects.
It was certainly the beginning of the end for Boeing as the market leader in large commercial aircraft.
Source...